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Counsel should use all available means to obtain information in
addition to the formal discovery process. In regard to discovery, counsel
should make requests as particular and specific as possible, thereby
limiting the courts' ability to recharacterize the requests as requests
which do not encompass the Brady material later found to have been
withheld. In addition, every request or demand must be made on the
record and must require that the trial judge rule on each and every piece
of information requested. Even in "open file" jurisdictions, the record
must reflect what was demanded, the response made, and exactly what
material defense counsel received, and when it was received.
Summary and analysis by:
Angela Dale Fields
WEEKS v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Late on the night of February 23, 1993, twenty year-old Lonnie
Weeks was travelling southbound on 1-95 between Washington and
Richmond with his twenty-one year-old uncle, Lewis J. Dukes, Jr.1
Dukes was driving the car at a high rate of speed when they passed the
vehicle of Virginia State Trooper Jose M. Cavazos around midnight.
Dukes eventually stopped the car on the Dale City exit ramp, where
Trooper Cavazos pulled up behind them.2 Trooper Cavazos asked the
two men to get out of the car. Dukes complied, but as Weeks exited, he
drew a pistol and shot the officer at least six times. Trooper Cavazos died
several minutes later.
3
Weeks and Dukes left the scene in their vehicle and stopped at a gas
station.4 Soon after at a nearby motel, another police officer stopped and
questioned Weeks and Dukes. They volunteered information about the
shooting, claiming they had "heard the shots" while in the motel parking
lot.5 Subsequent suspicious behavior on the part of Weeks and Dukes
prompted the police officers on the scene to detain them with their
consent.6 State police Special Agent J.K. Rowland advised Weeks that
he was "free to leave" but then read Weeks Miranda warnings. Weeks
wrote on the "Advice of Rights" form: "Do not want to discuss case
further."7 Meanwhile, Dukes told another police officer that Weeks had
I Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460,464,450 S.E.2d 379,382-
83 (1994).
2 Id. at 464, 450 S.E.2d at 383.
3 Id. at 465, 450 S.E.2d at 383.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 466, 450 S.E.2d at 383-84.
6 Id. at 466-67, 450 S.E.2d at 384.
7 Id. at 468,450 S.E.2d at 385.
8 Id. at 469, 450 S.E.2d at 385.
9 Id.
l Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(6) (Supp. 1994).
11 Weeks, 248 Va. at 463,450 S.E.2d at 382.
12 Id. at 464,450 S.E.2d at 382.
13 Id. at 478-79, 450 S.E.2d at 390-91.
14 As noted in the text, Weeks commendably raised forty-seven
assignments of error for appeal, although the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to consider ten of these errors since they were not briefed or
argued. For further information on these ten errors, see Section III and
the text accompanying Footnote 62 infra. As to some of the remaining
thirty-two issues, either the court summarily rejected them, they did not
involve death penalty law, or the court applied broad and well-settled
principles of law to situations which are too fact-specific to be useful
shot the trooper. When this police officer informed Rowland of Dukes'
account, Rowland arrested Weeks. 8 Later, at about 6:00 p.m. that
evening (February 24), Rowland asked Weeks if he remembered the
rights read to him earlier that day. Weeks answered that he did, was
questioned further, and soon confessed to shooting the trooper. 9
Weeks was indicted for capital murder for the willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of a police officer for the purpose of interfering
with the police officer's performance of official duties;10 grand larceny
of a motor vehicle; and use of a firearm in the commission of murder. 11
The jury later found Weeks guilty of capital murder and sentenced him
to death based on the "vileness" aggravating factor. After considering a
probation officer's report and the probation officer's testimony relating
to punishment, the court upheld the sentence of death.
12
HOLDING
Deciding his appeal and conducting its statutory review, the Su-
preme Court ofVirginiaheld that Weeks' sentencehad notbeen imposed
under passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, and that the sentence
was not excessive or disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar
cases. 13 The court also rejected all of his forty-seven assignments of
error 14 and affirned the conviction and sentence of death.15
generally. These issues include: (1) the constitutionality of Weeks's
two-hour detention without arrest; (2) the trial court's denial of Weeks's
motion to suppress his confession, based on the failure of authorities to
scrupulously honor Weeks's request to remain silent (more specifically,
the court's application of the five factors in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), used to
determine whether re-interrogation of a criminal defendant, once that
defendant has exercised his Miranda rights, is constitutional-see
Bieber, Commonwealth v. Burket: Don't Put All Your Defense Eggs in
the Suppression Basket, Capital Defense Digest, this issue); (3) the trial
court's error in denying individual voir dire; (4) the trial court's error in
denying Weeks' challenge for cause to ajuror whose wife's first cousin
had been a police officerkilled in the line of duty; (5) the trial court's error
in permitting hearsay testimony concerning statements of Dukes to
investigators that Weeks had killed the trooper, (6) the trial court's error
in denying Weeks's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence of
capital murder based on the evidence's failure to prove premeditation
sufficiently. Of the remaining issues, the trial court stated that it had
"considered all the arguments in support of those issues, and conclude[d]
that none ha[d] any merit." Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 390.
15 Weeks, 248 Va. at 479,450 S.E.2d at 391.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Denial of Ex Parte Motions
A. Motion for Disclosure of Records
The trial court denied three of Weeks' pre-trial motions made ex
parte. First, Weeks made an "Ex Parte Motion for Disclosure of Records
Maintained by the Central Criminal Records Exchange" (hereinafter
CCRE).16 The applicable statute provides in part:
Upon an ex parte motion of a defendant in a felony case and
upon the showing that the records requested may be relevant
to such case, the court shall enter an order requiring the Central
Criminal Records Exchange to furnish the defendant, as soon
as practicable, copies of any records of persons designated in
the order on whom a reporthas been made under the provisions
of this chapter.
17
Weeks requested copies of the criminal records of himself, Dukes,
and "certain North Carolina residents likely to be called as witnesses by
the prosecutor. ' 18 Apparently, the prosecutor arrived in court and
wished to argue against granting Weeks' motion. Weeks objected, but
the trial court overruled his objection. The court then denied the mo-
tion.19
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court had
committed no reversible error in denying the motion and rejected this
assignment of error accordingly. 20 The court stated that it would assume
arguendo21 that Weeks was "entitled to be heard ex parte, and that the
trial court erred in denying his motion under the statute," though it noted
that "the statute is silent about the nature of any hearing on such
motion."'22 But the court found that nothing in the trial record indicated
that the trial court's ruling had prejudiced Weeks. Additionally, the court
described Weeks' motion as "redundant," since the trial court had
previously ordered the Commonwealth to provide Weeks with criminal
history information concerning any Commonwealth witnesses at hear-
ings or trial.23
The Supreme Court of Virginia thus held that even if Weeks had a
statutory right to an ex parte hearing on his motion, the absence of a
showing of prejudice rendered the trial court's error harmless, leaving
Weeks without a remedy. 24 The court was correct in noting that the
statute says nothing about the nature of the hearing on this ex parte
motion. Otherwise, the statutory language is clear. Logically speaking,
an exparte motion means nothing without an implicit exparte hearing
16 Id. at 472, 450 S.E.2d at 387.
17 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-389 (Supp. 1994).
18 Weeks, 248 Va. at 472,450 S.E.2d at 387.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 The trial court also stated that it would assume that "the statute
is applicable to discovery in felony cases." Weeks, 248 Va. at 472,450
S.E.2d at 387.
22 Weeks, 248 Va. at 472,450 S.E.2d at 387.
23 Id. at 472-73, 450 S.E.2d at 387.
24 Id. at 472, 450 S.E.2d at 387.
25 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-389 (Supp. 1994).
26 220 Va. 943, 265 S.E.2d 705 (1980).
27 The statute which required such a filing, Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
187 (Supp. 1994), provides in relevant part:
In any hearing or trial of any criminal offense ... a
certificate of analysis of a person performing an analysis or
on that motion. The statute does not contemplate any sort of an adversary
proceeding. Additionally, the statute is almost entirely mandatory, not
discretionary. Defense counsel need only make a minimal showing of
relevance that the information requested "may be relevant to [the]
case" 25 to invoke the court's statutory duty to grant the defendant's
motion. The trial court's failure to grant Weeks an exparte hearing and
its eventual denial of the motion both clearly contravened the plain
meaning of the statute.
On at least one past occasion, such failure on the part of a trial court
to comply with a statutory mandate has led the Supreme Court of Virginia
to overturn a defendant's conviction without any showing of prejudice.
In Gray v. Commonwealth2 6 the Commonwealth's failure to comply
with statutory filing requirements for a certificate of forensic analysis led
the court to reverse the defendant's conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and remand the case for a new trial. 27 Thetrial court
in that case had held that the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the
filing requirement was not error since the defendant had not been
prejudiced. But the Supreme Court of Virginia held that prejudice to the
defendant was irrelevant.2 8 Instead, the court construed the statute
strictly against the Commonwealth, finding that the Commonwealth's
failure to follow the requirements of the statute exactly mandated a
reversal and remand.
The court in Grayrejected the Commonwealth's arguments in favor
of reading requirements into the statute which were not in the text. The
court stated that the filing requirements statute "deals with criminal
matters, and it undertakes to make admissible evidence which otherwise
might be subject to a valid hearsay objection. Thus, the statute should be
construed strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the ac-
cused."29 The court further noted that reading additional requirements
into the statute, as the Commonwealth was suggesting, "would be to
construe the statute strictly against the accused and in favor of the
Commonwealth, a result clearly contrary to the applicable rule of
construction."30
Analogizing Gray to Weeks' case, both the Commonwealth's
presence at the hearing and the trial court's denial of the motion could
only be justified by the trial court's (or Supreme Court of Virginia's)
reading additional requirements into the statute, as those courts did. But
under Gray, whether or not Weeks was prejudiced should have been
irrelevant. The statute should have been construed strictly against the
Commonwealth and Weeks' conviction should have been overturned.
Nonetheless, attorneys in Virginia should understand that, under
the rationale of Weeks, defendants effectively may not be entitled to a
statutory right to an exparte hearing on this particular motion unless they
are prepared to put in the record for appellate review a showing that the
examination, performed in any laboratory operated by the
Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services or the Division
of Forensic Science or authorized by such Division to conduct
such analysis or examination... when such certificate is duly
attested by such person, shall be admissible in evidence as
evidence of the facts therein stated and the results of the
analysis or examination referred to therein, provided (i) the
certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court hearing
the case at least seven days prior to the hearing or trial.
28 Gray, 220 Va. at 946, 265 S.E.2d at 706.
29 Id. at 945, 265 S.E.2d at 706 (citing Ansell v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 759, 761,250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)).
30 Id. at 946, 265 S.E.2d at 706.
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Commonwealth's attendance or the denial of the motion prejudiced the
defendant. Furthermore, nothing in the court's opinion suggested or
stated that this "prejudice" analysis could not or would not be extended
to other statutory rights of defendants. Counsel should therefore continue
to insist that the denial of an ex parte hearing, as per this statute, is
manifest error. If the trial court rejects this argument, counsel's options
are limited. It is suggested that counsel request a post-trial hearing, at
which counsel attempts to get in the record a showing that the defendant
was prejudiced by the clearly erroneous denial of a clear statutory right.
Weeks virtually requires such a showing. Denial of the post-trial hearing
would constitute a separate error. This claim should also be federalized
to preserve it through all stages of future state and federal review. The
federal basis for such an error is that an arbitrary denial of a state created
right constitutes a denial of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.
31
B. Motion for Scientific Investigation
Weeks' second pre-trial motion was a "Motion For Scientific
Investigation, Ex Parte." The statute governing this motion provides in
relevant part:
In any case in which an attorney of record for a person
accused of violation of any criminal law of the Common-
wealth, or the accused, may desire a scientific investigation, he
shall, by motion filed before the court in which the charge is
pending, certify that in good faith he believes that a scientific
investigation may be relevant to the criminal charge. The
motion shall be heard ex parte as soon as practicable and the
court shall, after a hearing upon the motion and being satisfied
as to the correctness of the certification, order that the same be
performed by the Division of Forensic Science or the Division
of Consolidated Laboratory Services .... 
32
Weeks requested the scientific investigation to ascertain informa-
tion about Trooper Cavazos' death, such as whether he had died instantly
from his wounds. 33 At the hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated
it would hear the motion when Weeks showed that he could not obtain
the results of any such tests which the state Division of Forensic Science
had probably already performed. Weeks' attorney withdrew the motion
as untimely instead of objecting when the trial court imposed an obliga-
tion not found in the statute.
34
The attorney apparently never renewed the motion. The Supreme
Court of Virginia stated that Weeks could not contest the ruling on appeal
since he had "acquiesced in the trial court's ruling."35 The court's
holding as to this motion presents similar problems to its holding on the
Motion for Disclosure of Records. If anything, the holding is more
clearly erroneous because the statute explicitly provides for an exparte
31 See, e.g., Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (violation of
Due Process for state to deprive inmate of statutory right to good time
credit without following appropriate procedures); Hicks v. Oklahoma,
447 U.S. 343 (1980) (violation of Due Process for state to deprive
defendant of statutory right to jury sentencing; such denial was arbitrary
denial of defendant's liberty interest created by the statute). See gener-
ally Konrad, How to Look the Virginia Gift Horse in the Mouth: Federal
Due Process and Virginia's Arbitrary Abrogation of Capital Defendant's
State-CreatedRights, Capital DefenseDigest, Vol. 3,No. 2,p. 16(1991).
32 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-434.11 (Supp. 1994). See also Heavner,
Leaving No Stone Unturned: Alternative Methods of Discovery in
Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
33 Weeks, 248 Va. at 473, 450 S.E.2d at 387.
hearing, and its subject matter is potentially more important to defen-
dants than the right to secure criminal records. The statute guaranteed
Weeks an affirmative right to investigative assistance.36 The statute only
requires that defendants make a minimal showing of a good faith belief
that the scientific investigation may be relevant to the defense's ef-
forts.37 Upon such a showing, made exparte, defendant is entitled to the
scientific assistance. The state of alternative sources of information
available to defendant is irrelevant.
Despite this minimal required showing, however, the trial court and
the Supreme Court of Virginia decided that counsel's failure to renew the
motion (and thus establish the minimal showing) defaulted it perma-
nently.38 This default also presents an issue. At the federal court level,
Weeks may have two available arguments to obtain relief from this
default. First, it can be argued that because this unlawful requirement was
unilaterally imposed by the trial judge, there was no default. Second, it
can be argued that because there were no adequate state grounds for the
state's action, Weeks could establish the requisite "cause and prejudice"
for habeas relief under Wainwright v. Sykes39 by arguing that the
imposition of a greater showing than is statutorily required caused the
default and prejudiced him by denying him the requested expert assis-
tance.
Additionally, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to be present
despite the statute's clear command that the motion be heard ex parte.
This result illustrates that even with minimal statutory requirements
imposed on defendants, statutory rights may still be defaulted unless
reasserted whenever counsel has the least indication that an issue may be
lost. The ease with which this occurred here should serve to warn counsel
about how simple it is for defendants to forfeit statutory rights when the
Supreme Court of Virginia seeks a way around plain errors.
Counsel should further note that the analysis in Gray v. Common-
wealth4 0 detailedsupra in Section I-A, may also be used to persuade trial
courts to construe statutes properly. Again, counsel is advised to insist on
aruling on these matters, refuse to make showings which are not required
by statute, and make post-trial proffers demonstrating prejudice from
denial of statutory guarantees. In many cases prejudice from violation of
2.1-434.11 will be significant and easier to demonstrate than the effect
of violations of 19.2-389.
C. Ake Motion
Weeks also made a motion for expert assistance concerning pathol-
ogy and ballistics. The trial court denied both his request to be heard ex
parte on this motion and the motion itself.41 Weeks had requested that
his motion for funding this expert assistance "'be treated under the same
procedure as required by Title 18 USC 3006A(e) in Federal Court."' 42
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed and rejected this assignment of
error, stating that the court had "already decided that a defendant charged
34 Id. at 473, 450 S.E.2d at 388.
35 Id.
36 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-434.11 (Supp. 1994).
37 The statute states that "[u]pon... request" the Division shall
provide the defense any investigation results it has conducted "which is
related in any way to a crime for which such person is accused." Va. Code
Ann. § 2.1-434.11 (Supp. 1994).
38 Weeks, 248 Va. at 473,450 S.E.2d at 388.
39 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
40 220 Va. 943, 265 S.E.2d 705 (1980).
41 Weeks, 248 Va. at 473, 450 S.E.2d at 388.
42 Id.
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with capital murder is not entitled to an ex parte hearing on his motion for
expert assistance." 43
The United States Supreme Court's decision inAke v. Oklahoma44
may conflict with the Supreme Court of Virginia's pronouncement.
Although Ake involved expert assistance for an insanity defense, the
Court's analysis has since been extended to many other forms of expert
assistance,45 including the pathology and ballistics assistance which
Weeks sought.46 InAke the Court held that when defendants have made
a preliminary showing that expert assistance is so essential to their
particular case as to be one of the "'basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal,"' due process requires a state to provide that assistance.47
Implicit, if notvirtually explicit, inAke's holding was thenotion thatsuch
defendants were entitled to be heard exparte when they desired to make
a showing of necessity for the assistance at trial. "When the defendant is
able to make an exparte threshold showing to the trial court thathis sanity
is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance
of a psychiatrist is readily apparent."
'48
First, defense counsel is advised to make such Ake requests on
federal grounds-that denial of this assistance is denial of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, an exparte hearing on that
motion is vital to defense counsel's efforts in such situations. To make
the preliminary showing required in Ake, defense counsel must present
evidence to the court which, were it known to the prosecution, could
easily be used against the defense. Additionally, most capital defendants
are indigent and represented by appointed counsel. Neither they nor their
counsel can afford the expert assistance, and so must call on the authority
of Ake. Wealthy defendants have no need to disclose information to the
prosecution when obtaining expert assistance. Further, the resources of
the Commonwealth far outweigh the resources of these defendants and
the Commonwealth is not required to make disclosures to defendants in
order to secure those resources.
Counsel is strongly urged to persevere with this issue by contesting
the denial of an exparte hearing and by preserving and briefing this error
at all stages of appeal. At the very least, whether defense counsel is
entitled to an exparte hearing on an Ake motion is a more complex issue
than was indicated by the court's cursory treatment of it in Weeks'
appeal.
IT. Denial of Motion for Bill of Particulars
Weeks also moved for a bill of particulars, which included a request
to identify the aggravating factors which the Commonwealth would seek
43 Id. The decision cited for this proposition was Ramdass v.
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413,422,437 S.E.2d 566,571 (1993), rev'don
other grounds sub nom. Ramdass v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
44 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
45 See, e.g., O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 685, 364
S.E.2d 491,499 (1988) (court appointment of forensic expert); United
States v.Patterson,724F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1984) (fingerprint specialist);
Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975) (ballistics expert);
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (pathologist); United
States v. Fogarty, 558 F.Supp. 856 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (handwriting
analyst); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F.Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970) (serologist).
See also Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. 1986) (dental expert);
Patterson v. State, 232 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1977) (narcotics analyst).
46 See Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (pathol-
ogy); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975) (ballistics).
47 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citation omitted). The showing required is
quite extensive. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,323 n. 1
(1985) (motion for investigator, fingerprint, and ballistics expert must be
supported by more than "undeveloped assertions"); Messerv. Kemp, 831
to prove in order to authorize a death sentence and a request for narrowing
constructions of the "vileness" factor if the Commonwealth intended to
rely upon it. The trial court partially denied these motions. The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that since Weeks had not challenged the suffi-
ciency of the indictment, no bill of particulars was required.49 The
court's holding raises two important concerns. First, there are constitu-
tional grounds for requesting notice of aggravating factors. Refusing to
grant this motion denies defendants their due process right to defend
against the state's case for death. This issue is more fully discussed in the
case summary of Williams v. Commonwealth,50 this issue. One aspect of
this is illustrated, however, in Weeks. It is the danger that a defendant will
find out what the appellate court determines to constitute "vileness" only
after he has been convicted and sentenced to death based on that factor.
After Weeks' conviction and death sentence, the Supreme Court of
Virginia explained that "vileness" in this case was established in part by
the fact that Weeks "returned to the scene, falsely claiming that he
attempted to render assistance to the victim when his real purpose was to
retrieve incriminating evidence."51 The indictment gave him no notice
of the aggravating factors to be used in his case. Weeks had no opportu-
nity to contest the court's claim, since he had no notice that these
incidents would be used to establish "vileness" in his case. He could offer
no evidence to rebut the evidence the appellate court would later
conclude established "vileness." In particular, he had no notice that
evidence of his real purpose in returning to the scene might be pivotal to
his eligibility for a death sentence.
Denial of this opportunity to defend against the state's case fordeath
may and should eventually be held reversible error. Capital defense
attorneys are advised to keep insisting on a bill of particulars or some
form of record notice of the aggravating factors and narrowing construc-
tions. Attorneys are also advised that the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the state's case fordeath is firmly established in analogous
United States Supreme Court decisions, including Gardner v. Florida,
52
Skipper v. South Carolina,5 3 Lankford v. Idaho,54 and Simmons v. South
Carolina.55
II. Incorporation by Reference on Appeal of Previous
Materials of Record
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to hear Weeks' claim that
the Virginia capital murder and death penalty statutes are unconstitu-
tional. 56 The court decided that Weeks' impermissible effort to incorpo-
rate by reference a trial court memorandum on this issue defaulted his
claim.57 Unfortunately this rule, set forth in Jenkins v. Common-
F.2d 946,960 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (en banc) (insufficient showing of role of
requested psychiatric expert in relation to behavior of defendant); Moore
v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 718 (1lth Cir. 1987) (en banc) (motion for
independent forensic experts insufficient as to type of expert and roles
they would play). Consequently, much of defense strategy often must be
revealed in order to make this showing.
48 Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
49 Weeks, 248 Va. at 474,450 S.E.2d at 388.
50 248 Va. 528, 450 S.E.2d 365 (1994).
51 Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 478, 450 S.E.2d at 391.
52 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
53 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
54 500 U.S. 110 (1991).
55 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
56 Weeks, 248 Va. at 474,450 S.E.2d at 388. The court observed
that it had rejected similar claims repeatedly, suggesting the same result
even if the claims had not been found to be defaulted.
57 Id.
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wealth,5 8 forces capital defendants into a Catch-22 situation. Under
Virginia's strict procedural default rules, defendants must raise, pre-
serve, and brief every issue at every level of appeal.59 Failure to do so
can preclude lifesaving claims from federal review.60 But Virginia also
places a fifty page brief limitation on appellants.6 1 If a defendant cannot
fit all of his claims within fifty pages, he either must default these issues
or attempt to raise them in some other way. The only ways to insure full
and fair presentation of claims are either to incorporate previous briefs
or memoranda by reference or to request relief from the fifty page limit.
In fact, Weeks was unable to brief several issues he had assigned as error
because the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his request for relief from
the limit.62
Since defendants must preserve all issues on appeal, arguably
they should be able to incorporate previous briefs or memoranda by
reference. This is especially important in capital cases because all non-
frivolous issues must be preserved, including those repeatedly rejected
by the Supreme Court of Virginia, if a client is to benefit from later
favorable constitutional rulings. 63 All previous briefs or memoranda
automatically become part of the record in Virginia and thus there would
be no problems with identification of the materials or access to them by
the adverse party. 64 But the Supreme Court of Virginia does not agree.
Defense counsel is therefore advised to pursue the second option men-
tioned above-to ask the court for relief from the fifty page limitation.
If the court refuses, counsel should ask for reconsideration of the issue
and specifically identify the claims desired to be raised, but requiring
relief from the page limit. Though the request for reconsideration itself
may be unsuccessful, it could provide a basis for subsequent habeas
corpus claims. Basic habeas law states that there is no default if there was
no full and fair opportunity to be heard.65 The Supreme Court of Virginia
may continue to put capital appellants in this box, but a properly made
record may persuade the federal courts to refuse to be accomplices.
66
58 244 Va. 445,461,423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1862 (1993).
59 See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17, 5:25.
60 See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
61 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:26(a).
62 Telephone Interview with Daniel Morrissette, trial attorney for
Lonnie Weeks, Jr. (February 28, 1995). Mr. Morrissette indicated that
he knew of other cases where capital defendants had been granted relief
from this limitation. If correct, this fact may also have implications for
the default problem. If a state procedural rule is not uniformly applied,
a federal court is not bound to accept it as an adequate state rule, and may
grant the defendant habeas corpus relief from defaulting the rule. See
infra note 65 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991); Simmons v. South Carolina,
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), and case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 4 .
64 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:10,5:15.
65 See, e.g., Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 421-25 (1991)
(retroactive application of procedural rule based on case decided after
defendant's trial not allowed since defendant would have no notice of
such procedure); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587-89 (1988)
(state court denial of post-conviction relief based on waiver is inad-
equate); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341,348-49 (1984) (rejecting state
court denial of relief based on a distinction that is unclear and not closely
followed); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 150-
51 (1979) (claim not defaulted when state did not have clear rule
applicable to the issue raised).
IV. Victim Impact Testimony
The Commonwealth introduced evidence of the impact of Trooper
Cavazos' death on both his family and on the troopers who were his co-
workers.67 Such impact evidence is allowed in the post-sentence report
to the trial judge.68 But the Virginia Code is silent about such testimony
to the jury before it has fixed punishment. Weeks attacked the use of
victim impact testimony on two grounds. First, he argued that victim
impact testimony is irrelevant to the jury's sentencing decision. Second,
he contended that even if such testimony were relevant, such evidence
should be limited to impact on only the family of Trooper Cavazos, and
should not be extended to the trooper's fellow police officers (i.e., co-
workers).
69
In rejecting the first argument, the court relied on the Virginia
Code's silence as to victim impact testimony before the jury and on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee.70 In
Payne the Court decided that states could allow victim impact testimony
in capital cases if they so desired,71 thus overruling two previous United
States Supreme Court cases which held otherwise,7 2 Booth v. Mary-
land73 and South Carolina v. Gathers.74 The Supreme Court of Virginia
decided that since Payne allowed the states to use victim impact testi-
mony and the Virginia Code was silent on the subject, the
Commonwealth's use of such evidence was permissible in Weeks's
trial. 75
Weeks' second attack on the use of victim impact testimony was
that such testimony should not be extended to the trooper's co-workers.
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that Weeks had defaulted this
claim.7 6 The court decided that Weeks had not distinguished between
the testimony of family members and the testimony of co-workers or
other sources at trial, and so could not challenge the admissibility of the
troopers' testimony on appeal.
77
66 For a more complete treatment of this issue, see Ahrend, Beating
a Potential Deathtrap: How to Preserve the Appellate Record for
Federal Review and Avoid Virginia's Procedural Default, Capital De-
fense Digest, this issue. See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va.
528, 450 S.E.2d 365 (1994), and case summary of Williams, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
67 Weeks, 248 Va. at 475-76, 450 S.E.2d at 389.
68 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 states that victim impact statements
in capital cases shall be made in the same form as victim impact
statements described in § 19.2-299.1. Although § 299.1 (enacted before
§ 264.5) explicitly states that victim impact statements shall not be
included in the pre-sentence report in capital cases, § 264.5 evidently
supersedes that particular provision on § 299.1 (since it was enacted
subsequent to § 299.1 and since it explicitly provides that victim impact
statements shall be made in capital cases).
69 Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 389.
70 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
71 Id. at 827.
72 Id. at 828-30.
73 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
74 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
75 Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E.2d at 389.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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Had Weeks not been held to have defaulted this second claim,
however, he may have had aviable argument. The United States Supreme
Court stated in Payne (in a passage that the Supreme Court of Virginia
quoted verbatim in Weeks) that"[a] State may legitimately conclude that
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the
death penalty should be imposed."'78 The Court's holding says nothing
about such testimony being admitted as to any persons other than family
78 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (emphasis added).
members. Consequently, defense counsel should object if the Common-
wealth attempts to put on victim impact testimony as to anyone other than
family members. This issue should be distinguished from objecting to
victim impact testimony by family members, so as to avoid the fate of
default that Weeks suffered. If overruled, counsel should preserve the
issue on federal constitutional grounds so that it may ultimately be
resolved on its merits in a federal habeas proceeding.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
BURKET v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On January 14, 1993, Katherine Tafelski and her daughter Ashley,
age five, were found dead in their beds in the family residence. Autopsies
revealed that both victims suffered massive head injuries, inflicted by the
same blunt object. Katherine suffered sexual penetration by an inanimate
object. It was determined that the victims' wounds were inflicted by
automotive tools. Katherine's son Andrew, age three, was found uncon-
scious in his bed, suffering a double break in his jaw and an eye wound.
The children's friend, Chelsea Brothers, suffered bruises to her entire
body. I
Russel Burket lived next door to the Tafelskis. During a videotaped
police station interrogation on January 20,1993, Burket confessed to the
murders and assaults.2 Burket was charged with double homicide, two
counts of malicious wounding, sexual penetration with an inanimate
object, and statutory burglary. After the trial court denied a motion to
suppress the confession, Burketpled guilty to all the charges butreserved
the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his statements.
3
In a separate penalty hearing, Burket received two life sentences
and two twenty year terms for the four non-capital convictions.4 Burket
was sentenced to death for the capital murder, predicated upon findings
of both "future dangerousness" and "vileness." 5
Burket appealed only the capital murder conviction. Among his
assignments of error, Burket argued it was error for the trial court not to
suppress his confession which was obtained in a custodial interrogation
in violation of his Miranda rights and Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel.
6
I Burketv. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596,599-602,450 S.E.2d 124,
126-27 (1994).
2 248 Va. at 602-04,450 S.E.2d at 128-29.
3 248 Va. at 598-99,450 S.E.2d at 125-26.
4 248 Va. at 599, 450 S.E.2d at 126.
5 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
6 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 604, 450 S.E.2d at 129.
7 In light of Burket's failure to raise at trial the issues of victim
impact testimony and parole eligibility, the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to address the issues on appeal. 248 Va. at 612-613, 616, 450
S.E.2d at 133, 135. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25. Burket also argued that the
HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Burket's death sentence with
his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found no reversible error on any of the presented issues,
7
including the admissibility of Burket's confession.
8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In upholding the admissibility of Burket's confession, the Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected the Miranda violations alleged by Burket.
First, Burket claimed that his initial request for counsel was made in a
custodial interrogation, thereby triggering his right to Miranda warnings
which were not administered until after detectives obtained a full-blown
confession.9 Second, given the detectives' failure to immediately issue
the Miranda wamings, Burket claimed his later custodial statements
were rendered inadmissible. 10 Third, after finally being advised of his
Miranda rights, Burket argued that they were violated by the failure of
his interrogators to terminate questioning. 11 Finally, Burket alleged the
trial court erred in finding that he validly waived his Miranda rights.
12
Based on the trial court findings and its own independent review of the
record, the court found no merit to any of these claims.
death penalty was imposed contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment and his right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. These challenges were also sum-
marily dismissed by the court on the basis of precedent. 248 Va. at 612,
450 S.E.2d at 133.
8 248 Va. at 617,450 S.E.2d at 135.
9 248 Va. at 604,450 S.E.2d at 129.
10 Id.
11 248 Va. at 608,450 S.E.2d at 131.
12 248 Va. at 611, 450 S.E.2d at 132.
